Pittsburgh University School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Book Chapters

Faculty Publications

2012

Internation Equity and Human Development
Anthony C. Infanti
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, infanti@pitt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_book-chapters
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons,
Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and Society Commons, Macroeconomics Commons,
Organization Development Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Anthony C. Infanti, Internation Equity and Human Development, TAX LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_book-chapters/4

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT
LAW. It has been accepted for inclusion in Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT
LAW. For more information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

Internation equity and human development
Anthony C. Infanti

I.

Introduction
When we speak of ‘equity’ in tax policy circles, what usually springs to mind

is interindividual equity; that is, the concern within a tax system of taxing similarly
situated taxpayers similarly (‘horizontal’ equity) and taxing differently situated
taxpayers in an appropriately differentiated fashion (‘vertical’ equity). In their
seminal essay, Richard and Peggy Musgrave approached tax equity from a broader
perspective and considered how the international context both complicates questions
of interindividual equity and ‘creates the additional problem of equity among states
and nations’.1 The Musgraves had earlier labeled this latter problem—and titled
their 1972 essay discussing it—‘inter-nation equity’.2
In that essay, the Musgraves added a new dimension to the discussion of tax
equity by viewing the concept through an international lens. In this Chapter, I add a
new dimension to the Musgraves’ discussion of tax equity, building on my earlier
work critiquing the U.S. domestic tax equity debate.3 There, I viewed tax equity

Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity, in MODERN
FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63, 63 (Richard M. Bird & John
G. Head eds., 1972).
2 E.g., PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 130–33 (1969); see Kim Brooks, Inter-nation
Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated International Tax
Policy Objective, in TAX REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A VOLUME IN MEMORY OF
RICHARD MUSGRAVE 471, 472 & n.2 (2009).
3 Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008). At the outset, it is
worth noting that my purpose in this Chapter is not to undertake a comprehensive
critique of the Musgraves’ conceptualization of internation equity. Instead, I
1
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through a critical lens and highlighted the debate’s overweening focus on the
economic dimension of individuals. Here, I lay that same critical lens over the
Musgraves’ international lens in considering the role that tax equity might play in
advancing human development.
Strong parallels exist between the U.S. domestic tax equity debate and the
internation equity debate. In this Chapter, I first observe how discussions of
internation equity track established notions of interindividual equity. Internation
equity has distinctly ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ aspects to it, and the ‘vertical’ aspect
of internation equity—like its interindividual equity counterpart—focuses entirely
on the economic dimension of people. Although commentators sometimes chafe at
the economic focus of internation equity, they have failed to break out of this
constraint.
Continuing to trace the parallels between these debates, I then describe how
they are plagued by a tax ‘exceptionalism’ that acts like a set of blinkers limiting the
horizons of debate. I argue that it is time to remove these blinkers and recognize the
larger foreign policy and development context within which the internation equity
debate is situated. This is important because the larger debate over development has
been undergoing a similar transformation from a narrow focus on economic growth
and per capita income to a wider focus on human development.
I next offer some initial thoughts on how countries might reform their extant
international tax rules to embrace a wider focus on human development. I close with
a description of the advantages of expanding the internation equity debate to
address both economic and noneconomic lines of difference among nations in an
narrowly focus my attention here on one approach to internation equity articulated
by the Musgraves—namely, redistribution.
2

effort to encourage all countries to advance human development, especially for the
most vulnerable among us.

II.

Internation equity
A.

The Musgraves’ description

In their 1972 essay, the Musgraves explain internation equity with the help
of a simple case involving multiple countries. For the Musgraves, the crux of
internation equity lies in determining the appropriate allocation of national gain or
loss among these countries: ‘Let X, a resident of A, invest in B. Income earned
thereon constitutes a national “gain” to country A. If country B taxes income earned
by X, the gain accruing to country A as a nation is reduced. This is the issue of internation equity’.4 Whether this national gain or loss is accompanied by a gain or loss to
country A’s treasury is a different question, because that ‘is a matter of intra-nation
transfer between treasury and individual and does not affect the existence of
national gain or loss’.5 Thus, the subject of internation equity is nations—not
individuals—and the crux of internation equity is ‘whether and how’ the country of
source will tax.6
In exploring the question of whether and how the source country will tax, the
Musgraves discussed four different approaches: (1) benefit taxation, (2) source
taxation, (3) national rental charges and (4) redistribution. A brief summary of each
of these four approaches follows.
Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 1, at 68.
Id.
6 Id. at 69.
4
5
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First, under the benefit principle, ‘each jurisdiction would charge for services
which it has rendered’.7 The Musgraves summarily dismissed the idea of allocating
taxing jurisdiction based on the benefit principle because ‘[m]ost taxes are not
imposed on a benefit basis’.8
Second, the Musgraves concluded that residence-based taxation ‘has no
bearing on inter-nation equity’ because ‘[s]uch national gain as country A derives is
obtained by it whether A’s treasury imposes a tax or not’.9 In contrast, source-based
taxation is relevant to internation equity because it permits a country ‘to tax income
which results from activities undertaken in its borders. That is to say B is permitted
to tax X’s income and thus to appropriate part of A’s national gain’.10 If a country
imposes tax based on the source of income, the Musgraves argue that a rule of
nondiscrimination should apply; that is, ‘B should tax income received by X as if it
were received by B’s own residents’.11
Third, turning from a legal to an economic perspective, the Musgraves
discuss the possibility that, were it resource rich but capital poor, country B might
justifiably argue that it is entitled to ‘obtain a rental or royalty share in A’s gain over
and above the addition to its labor income’.12 This national rental would take the
form of a tax but would be imposed outside of country B’s domestic tax system. In
essence, the levy would constitute ‘an in rem tax on operations by foreigners’.13

Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 71–72.
12 Id. at 73.
13 Id.
7
8
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Finally and most directly relevant to this Chapter, the Musgraves turned to
the possibility that internation equity might serve ‘as an instrument of international
redistribution’.14 As they explain, ‘[w]ith a highly unequal distribution of resource
endowments and per capita income among countries and in the absence of an
adequate method for dealing with the problem, an appropriate pattern of taximposed national gains and losses might be used to secure some degree of
adjustment’.15 The Musgraves proposed a uniform rate schedule for corporate
taxation that would, by international agreement, apply in all capital-importing
countries.
The rates would not be reciprocal, as are the withholding tax rates in current
tax treaties. Rather, the rates ‘would be related inversely to per capita income in the
capital-importing country and directly to per capita income in the capital-exporting
country. This would improve the relative position of low-income countries’.16 Thus, at
one extreme, the Musgraves proposed applying a rate of 60% where the per capita
income of the capital-exporting country was greater than $1000 and the per capita
income of the capital-importing country was less than $250. At the other extreme,
the Musgraves proposed applying a rate of 10% where the per capita income of the
capital-exporting country was less than $250 and the per capita income of the
capital-importing country was greater than $1000.

B.

‘Horizontal’ v. ‘vertical’ internation equity

Id. at 74.
Id.
16 Id.
14
15
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This fourth approach of the Musgraves is quite distinct from the prior three.
To borrow the familiar terminology used in domestic discussions of tax equity for
rhetorical purposes only,17 the first three approaches (i.e. benefit taxation, source
taxation, and national rental charges) all have a ‘horizontal’ flavor to them. Indeed,
when discussing the situation where income is derived from a combination of
activities in several different countries, the Musgraves advocate the adoption of
‘taxation . . . on an international basis’ with formulary apportionment to allocate the
tax on those profits among the several countries that can claim to be their origin. 18
In contrast, the fourth approach (i.e. redistribution) has a ‘vertical’ flavor to it.
It does not concern the competing claims of similarly situated capital-importing
countries to a share of the profits generated within their respective territories.
Instead, it concerns the allocation of the tax base between differently situated
capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. The fourth approach thus
recognizes the reality that all states are not situated equally and that ‘states will
vary significantly in their resources and power’.19
The Musgraves highlight the distinctive nature of the fourth approach when
discussing the multiple-source-country situation. They qualify their advocacy of
As I have explained elsewhere, there is significant controversy among U.S. tax
academics over whether the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity have
independent significance. See Infanti, supra note 3, at 1192–94. In contrast, I have
argued that, ‘[f]ar from lacking normative content, tax equity abounds with it.’ Id. at
1195. For instance, by judging the fairness of income tax policy solely by reference to
taxpayers’ income, tax equity ‘effectively forecloses consideration of non-economic
forms of difference (e.g., of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or physical
ability) when determining the appropriate allocation of societal burdens, even
though these other forms of difference have served, and continue to serve, as the
basis for invidious discrimination that already imposes heavy burdens on its victims.’
Id. at 1196.
18 Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 1, at 84.
19 Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax
Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 558 (2009).
17
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formulary apportionment by stating that there should be an ‘allocation of proceeds
on an apportionment basis among the participating countries, making allowance for
distributional considerations’.20 In other words, in keeping with the first three
approaches, there should be a horizontal allocation of the tax base among the several
source countries. But that horizontal allocation should then be altered to take
account of the vertical differences in per capita income levels between these source
countries.
The first three approaches to internation equity all view the nations
connected to the generation of income as co-equal sovereigns competing for their fair
portions of a shared tax base. The fourth approach expands this view to recognize
that these nations comprise groups of people, some of which are economically better
off than others. It further acknowledges that the economic differences between these
groups might properly influence what is considered to be a fair sharing of the tax
base. This represents a marked shift away from viewing nations connected with the
generation of income as a homogeneous group of sovereigns vying to exercise their
taxing jurisdiction to a (slightly) more nuanced view of them as heterogeneous
groups of people with different resource endowments and average levels of income.

C.

The focus on per capita income

The focus on income in describing the redistributive aspect of internation
equity is worth further exploration. The Musgraves explicitly recognize that nations,
like individuals, are different from one another. But the only differences that the

20

Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 1, at 85 (emphasis added).
7

Musgraves deem relevant to their analysis are along the lines of resource
endowments and per capita income. And in their proposal, they collapse even these
two lines of difference into one. The Musgraves’ proposed sliding scale of tax rates
uses per capita income as the only metric for determining whether and how
redistribution should occur.
Although Peggy Musgrave often revisited and refined this seminal
articulation of internation equity in her later work,21 she has never returned in any
sustained way to the redistributive aspect of internation equity.22 Other
commentators have followed her lead. In one of the most in-depth treatments of
internation equity, Nancy Kaufman focuses on questions of division of the tax base
among co-equal sovereigns and merely mentions the redistributive aspect of
internation equity.23 Other commentators focus exclusively on horizontal allocation

Brooks, supra note 2, at 480–87.
E.g., Peggy B. Musgrave, International Tax Differentials for Multinational
Corporations: Equity and Efficiency Considerations, in THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 43, 46–48 (Carl S. Shoup ed., 1974); Peggy B. Musgrave, The OECD
Model Tax Treaty: Problems and Prospects, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Summer 1975,
29, 36–37; Peggy B. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and Competition in an
International Setting, in RETROSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC FINANCE 276, 294–96
(Lorraine Eden ed., 1991); Peggy B. Musgrave, ‘Substituting Consumption-Based
Direct Taxation for Income Taxes as the International Norm’: A Comment, 45 NAT’L
TAX J. 179, 180–81 (1992); Peggy B. Musgrave, Consumption Tax Proposals in an
International Setting, 54 TAX L. REV. 77 (2000); Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdiction
Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the European Union, in
TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR
REFORM 46, 59 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000); Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty,
Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335,
1340 (2001); Peggy B. Musgrave, Combining Fiscal Sovereignty and Coordination:
National Taxation in a Globalizing World, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE:
RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 167, 175–77 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceição
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Musgrave, Combining Fiscal Sovereignty].
23 Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145, 191–92, 203 (1998) [hereinafter Kaufman, Fairness]; see Nancy
21
22
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of the tax base and make no mention at all of the redistributive aspect of internation
equity.24
Approaching the question of redistribution directly—but failing to address
the Musgraves’ contribution to the literature—Ilan Benshalom provides a limited
moral or philosophical basis for global wealth redistribution through the
international tax regime.25 Benshalom eschews cosmopolitan or statist approaches to
global distributive justice and proposes an alternative, ‘relational-distributive’
approach that relies upon economic relationships as the foundation for global wealth
redistribution.26 Yet, even without directly addressing the Musgraves’
conceptualization of internation equity, Benshalom proposes a framework that
nonetheless relies upon nations’ relative incomes as the cornerstone for determining
whether a relational-distributive duty exists.27
Similarly, Diane Ring has approached the redistributive aspect of internation
equity in the context of discussing the role of sovereignty in the tax competition
debate.28 Ring strongly questions whether internation equity can play any role in the
debate over tax competition because ‘firm foundations for a generally accepted vision

H. Kaufman, Equity Considerations in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1465 (2001).
24 E.g., Rifat Azam, E-commerce Taxation and Cyberspace Law: The Integrative
Adaptation Model, 12 (5) VA. J.L. & TECH. ¶¶ 23, 32, 36, 97 (2007); William B.
Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing, and
Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 349 (2007); Klaus Vogel
Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income—A Review and Re-evaluation of
Arguments (part III), 11 INTERTAX 393, 398, 400, 401 (1988).
25 Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for
International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2010).
26 Id. at 9–36.
27 Id. at 59.
28 Ring, supra note 19.
9

of inter-nation equity have yet to be established’.29 When Ring does eventually
consider a ‘realistic’ application of internation equity claims to the tax competition
debate, her focus is entirely on the economic dimension of states.30 She speaks of the
possibility of ‘expand[ing] upon some of the accepted thinking on human rights to
encompass more clearly defined economic rights’.31 Ring’s concern here is not with
human rights generally but with the redistribution of wealth from higher-income
countries to lower-income countries in an effort to ensure a baseline of economic
subsistence.32
Other commentators addressing issues of internation equity have adopted
the same singular focus on income.33 Working within this framework, some
commentators have even noted the possibility that the international tax regime may
work a form of ‘reverse redistribution’, with lower-income countries ceding a portion
of their tax base under some circumstances to higher-income countries.34
Thus far, Kim Brooks has made the only contribution to the literature on
internation equity that attempts to break with an unbending focus on per capita
Id. at 583.
Id. at 590.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 E.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1648–51 (2000); Jinyan Li, Improving
Inter-nation Equity Through Territorial Taxation and Tax Sparing, in
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENTS 117 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010); Yoram Margalioth, Tax
Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System to
Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 192–97, 201–02 (2003); Ruth
Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1540, 1590–
91, 1593–99 (2009); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax
Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 600–08 (2007).
34 E.g., Aldo Forgione, Clicks and Mortar: Taxing Multinational Business Profits in
the Digital Age, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 719, 762, 766–67 (2003); Jinyan Li, The Rise
and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax Debates, 8
FLA. TAX REV. 669, 707–11 (2007).
29
30
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income.35 She approaches the question of revenue allocation between high- and lowincome countries from a feminist perspective and explores how that perspective
might support allocating a greater share of revenue to low-income countries.
Focusing on the role of tax treaties in the international tax regime, Brooks observes:
There are a wide range of ways feminists might approach tax treaties as a
tool for tempering the unregulated market: they could be used to compensate
low-income states for the prevalent abuses perpetuated by corporations
resident in high-income states; they might be used to allocate increased
international tax revenue to states that actively promote women’s equality;
and, finally, they might be used to punish corporate taxpayers who act in
ways that erode or hamper women’s equality.36
Among her particular suggestions, Brooks proposes allocating a larger share of tax
revenues to a low-income country that ‘better advances women’s equality’ or
imposing a tax penalty on multinational companies that ‘fail to adopt pay equity’.37
Though these suggestions do not so narrowly focus on per capita income, they do
generally incorporate and perpetuate the general income-centric focus of internation
equity by furnishing little more than a feminist justification for the redistribution of
wealth from high- to low-income countries.

III.

Tax blinkers

Kim Brooks, Global Distributive Justice: The Potential for a Feminist Analysis of
International Tax Revenue Allocation, 21 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 267 (2009).
36 Id. at 290–91.
37 Id. at 291, 292.
35
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Comment [ACI1]: extract

A.

Tax exceptionalism

Discussions of internation equity, like discussions of interindividual equity,
largely seem to occur in a tax vacuum. For instance, interindividual equity debates
in the United States—the country whose tax academic debates I am most familiar
with—proceed on the assumption that the tax laws form a closed system, even
though their ‘larger purpose is to allocate the burden of funding our government and
of paying for public services’.38 Tax is viewed as separate and apart from (and,
therefore, wholly unconcerned with) other areas of the law—not to mention the
spending side of the fiscal system and domestic social systems more generally. Thus,
as it is sometimes said in the United States, tax is treated as ‘exceptional’.
Viewing the world wearing tax blinkers, U.S. commentators generally ignore
the larger context in which the tax system operates and, consequently, ignore all
differences among taxpayers other than differences in amount or type of income.39
These commentators thus fail to take account of other forms of difference (e.g. race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and physical ability) that ‘have served, and
continue to serve, as the basis for invidious discrimination that already imposes
heavy burdens on its victims’.40 Elsewhere, I have urged U.S. commentators to take
a holistic view of the allocation and apportionment of burdens in American society.
More pointedly, I urged them to ‘begin to offer competing ideas about what makes a
tax system fair’ that take into account the nontax burdens imposed by American

Infanti, supra note 3, at 1195.
Id. at 1200.
40 Id. at 1196.
38
39
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society on groups that have traditionally been subordinated along lines other than
class.41
Debates about internation equity are similarly plagued by tax exceptionalism.
For example, U.S. commentators seem to view international tax as being separate
and apart from international law. Tellingly, Reuven Avi-Yonah begins his essay
‘International Tax as International Law’ with the question: ‘Is international tax law
part of international law?’42 He then candidly states that one of his aims in writing
the essay is ‘to persuade international tax lawyers and international tax academics
that their field is indeed part of international law’.43
Likewise, these commentators only rarely acknowledge that international tax
rules embodied in domestic law and tax treaties form part of a nation’s foreign policy.
Notably, Michael Graetz has recognized that ‘[f]oreign policy concerns have long
played an important role in U.S. international tax policy’.44 Indeed, he has neatly
summarized this history, which extends from the U.S. Congress’s creation of China
Trade Corporations in the 1920s to Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations in the
1940s to the Subpart F rules targeting developing countries in the 1960s—not to
mention the Congress’s denial of foreign tax credits to those who invested in South
Africa during apartheid and, even now, to those who participate in boycotts of
Israel.45 Graetz also pointed out that ‘[f]oreign policy objectives may influence
decisions about which countries to enter or cancel tax treaties with and the

Id. at 1197.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483,
483 (2004).
43 Id.
44 Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 307 (2001).
45 Id. at 307–08.
41
42
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appropriate parameters of treaty concessions’.46 Graetz further observed that, if tax
were to be used as a means of redistributing income among nations, then ‘[t]ax
policy, of course, would have to be coordinated with other policies such as foreign
policy and debt forgiveness’.47
In the same vein, it is rare to find U.S. commentators discussing the idea that
international tax provisions may constitute foreign aid or assistance. Obviously, tax
sparing, which the United States has consistently rejected, is widely viewed as a
form of foreign aid.48 Less obviously, David Pozen has highlighted how U.S. tax
expenditures relating to nonprofit organizations can be reconceptualized as a hidden
form of foreign aid or assistance.49
Of particular interest here, unilateral departures from a country’s exercise of
source tax jurisdiction can be conceptualized as tax expenditures. 50 For example, it
has been suggested that the U.S. portfolio interest exemption might be classified as
Id. at 310.
Id. at 301 n.165.
48 E.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION
16, 19 (1998); Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment
in Low-Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 505,
518–21 (2009); Yariv Brauner, A Framework for an Informed Study of the Realistic
Role of Tax in a Development Agenda, 42 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 275, 315 (2010).
49 David E. Pozen, Hidden Foreign Aid, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 641 (2007).
50 Allaire Urban Karzon, Tax Expenditures and Tax Reform, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1397,
1408–11 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985)).
It is worth noting that the discussion of tax expenditures in the text below
makes implicit assumptions about the baseline international tax regime—including
the relationship between source and residence taxing jurisdiction and whether
certain tax provisions constitute tax expenditures (and, therefore, hidden foreign
aid) as compared to that baseline. There are some—for example, Nancy Kaufman—
who would argue that the current international tax regime does not provide
assistance to lower-income countries, but works a redistribution in the opposite
direction. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. For an argument that tax
sparing is not a concession to the source state but a recognition of the source state’s
jurisdiction over an item of income, see Luís Eduardo Schoueri’s contribution to this
volume.
46
47
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a tax expenditure.51 Canada actually does classify its unilateral (as opposed to
treaty-based) departures from its nonresident withholding tax as tax expenditures.52
Australia likewise classifies its unilateral (as well as certain of its treaty-based)
departures from its nonresident withholding tax as tax expenditures.53 Such
reductions in a source country’s nonresident withholding tax inure to the benefit (i.e.
provide aid to) the residence country, which is permitted to retain that much more of
the national gain produced by its residents’ investments in the source country.
Similarly, the most common methods for mitigating double taxation—the
foreign tax credit and the exemption from tax of foreign source income—can also be
conceptualized as tax expenditures. For instance, it has been suggested that the U.S.
foreign tax credit might be classified as a tax expenditure when compared to a
baseline of allowing only a deduction for foreign taxes.54 In fact, Canada includes its
foreign tax credit on a list of arguable tax expenditures.55 The U.S. exclusions from
gross income for (1) certain income earned by U.S. citizens residing abroad and (2)
income of U.S. residents from sources within certain U.S. possessions are already
classified as tax expenditures.56

Karzon, supra note 50, at 1411–13; see Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 1598 n.91.
DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., TAX EXPENDITURES AND EVALUATIONS 2010, at 21 (2010)
[hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURES]; DEP’T OF FIN. CAN., TAX EXPENDITURES: NOTES TO
THE ESTIMATES/PROJECTIONS 2010, at 77–78 (2010).
53 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., TAX EXPENDITURES STATEMENT 2010, at 68–69, 72,
205–06 (2011).
54 Pozen, supra note 49, at 652 n.41 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2008: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 316 (2007), and Boris I.
Bittker, Accounting for Federal ‘Tax Subsidies’ in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX
J. 244, 250 n.15 (1969)).
55 TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 52, at 16.
56 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2012:
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 241, 257 (2010); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
51
52
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If recast as tax expenditures, both the credit and exemption methods of
mitigating double taxation may be seen as providing a benefit to source countries.
For instance, if the United States in its capacity as a residence country were to allow
its citizens and residents no more than a deduction for income taxes levied by a
source country, then it would deter investment abroad by its citizens and residents.
Under such a regime for the mitigation of double taxation, U.S. citizens and
residents would not invest capital abroad unless the foreign investment produced an
after-foreign-tax return greater than the pretax return on a U.S. domestic
investment.57 Accordingly, the more generous methods of mitigating double taxation
(i.e. the foreign tax credit and exemption methods) facilitate or even encourage
investment abroad when compared to a deduction baseline and, from that
perspective, provide a form of foreign aid to source countries.
Wearing their tax blinkers, commentators contributing to the internation
equity debate generally ignore the larger foreign policy framework in which the
international tax rules are situated. They concomitantly ignore the possibility that a
nation’s international tax rules can operate to provide foreign aid or assistance to
other countries—whether intentionally or unintentionally and whether consistently
or inconsistently with the nation’s larger foreign policy framework. Ignoring this
larger context, they (like their counterparts in U.S. domestic tax equity debates)
tend to focus on a single (economic) dimension of nations—per capita income—when
considering questions of internation equity.

B.

Removing the tax blinkers

NO. JCS-3-10, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2010–2014, at 32, 34 (Comm. Print 2010).
57 Musgrave & Musgrave, supra note 1, at 70.
16

By framing discussions of redistribution solely in terms of relative per capita
income, commentators replicate on the international level a U.S. domestic tax equity
debate rendered insipid by its one-dimensional focus on economic class. The only
difference between these debates about redistribution is that commentators
contributing to the international debate speak of high- and low-income ‘nations’
rather than high- and low-income ‘taxpayers’. This may lend the terms of the
international debate a comfortable feel and, by focusing on numbers, may even lend
it the veneer of objectivity that so many tax academics seem to yearn for.
Nevertheless, a narrow focus on per capita income is both problematic and outdated.
As Klaus Vogel long ago explained, ‘equity reasoning can never be based on a
single set of presumptions. In a complex world, it is necessary to consider multiple
aspects’.58 By removing our tax blinkers, we can recognize that internation equity is
just one component of each country’s foreign policy framework, and, more
specifically, of its development policy. Furthermore, Vogel’s words echo those of
contributors to the development literature who have argued in favor of expanding its
own traditionally narrow focus on economic growth to encompass additional
dimensions in an effort to make the idea of development more meaningful.
For example, Amartya Sen singles out ‘identifying development with the
growth of gross national product . . . or with the rise in personal incomes’ as
examples of ‘narrower views of development’.59 Instead, Sen persuasively argues
that:
… An adequate conception of development must go much beyond the
accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross national product and other
Klaus Vogel, The Search for Compatible Tax Systems, in TAX POLICY IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 76, 84 (Herbert Stein ed., 1988).
59 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (1999).
58
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income-related variables. Without ignoring the importance of economic
growth, we must look well beyond it.
The ends and means of development require examination and scrutiny
for a fuller understanding of the development process; it is simply not
adequate to take as our basic objective just the maximization of income or
wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted, ‘merely useful for the sake of something
else.’ For the same reason, economic growth cannot sensibly be treated as an
end in itself. Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the lives
we lead and the freedoms we enjoy. Expanding the freedoms that we have
reason to value not only makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but also
allows us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and
interacting with—and influencing—the world in which we live.60

IV.

Expanding the horizon
Other participants in debates over development policy have expanded their

horizons beyond economic growth and per capita income. For example, in the first
Human Development Report (HDR) in 1990, an independent team working under
the auspices of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) introduced the
Human Development Index (HDI) in an effort to move past the development
literature’s narrow focus on economic growth and expand the scope of development

60

Id. at 14–15; see id. at 3, 8–9, 90, 131, 290–92.
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measures.61 The 1990 HDR stated that ‘[t]he basic objective of development is to
create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy and creative lives’.62
The 2010 HDR contains a more refined conceptualization of human
development:
Human development is the expansion of people’s freedoms to live long,
healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to value;
and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on
a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human
development, as individuals and in groups.63
This people-centered conceptualization of human development is strongly grounded
in Amartya Sen’s capability approach,64 which focuses on ‘the “capabilities” of
persons to lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value’.65 Applying
this approach to the development context, Sen ‘treats the freedoms of individuals as
the basic building blocks’.66

Amartya Sen, Introduction to U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2010, at vi, vi (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HDR]. The HDRs typically contain a caveat
that they do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNDP but only those of the team
that produced them. For example, the 1990 HDR contains the following caveat in its
foreword: ‘The views expressed in this Report are those of the team and not
necessarily shared by UNDP or its Governing Council or the member governments
of UNDP. The essence of any such report must be its independence and its
intellectual integrity’. William H. Draper III, Foreword to U.N. DEV. PROGRAM,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, at iii, iv (1990). The independence of the
authors of the HDRs is considered to be one of the great strengths of these reports.
Desmond McNeill, ‘Human Development’: The Power of the Idea, 8 J. HUM. DEV. 5,
11–12 (2007).
62 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 12.
63 Id. at 22.
64 Id. at 16; see Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30
(Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
65 SEN, supra note 59, at 18.
66 Id.
61
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Sen views individual freedoms as having both a constitutive and an
instrumental role in development.67 He explains the constitutive role of freedom as
follows:
The constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of substantive
freedom in enriching human life. The substantive freedoms include
elementary capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as
starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality,
as well as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate,
enjoying political participation and uncensored speech and so on. 68
But freedom is not only the ‘primary end’ of development but also its ‘principal
means’.69 Thus, freedoms also have a role to play in contributing, ‘directly or
indirectly, to the overall freedom people have to live the way they would like to
live’.70 Sen groups instrumental freedoms into five basic categories: political
freedoms (e.g. civil rights, democracy and freedom of the press), economic facilities
(‘opportunities … to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or
production, or exchange’), social opportunities (e.g. education and health care),
transparency guarantees (i.e. the openness necessary for mutual trust), and
protective security (i.e. social safety net).71

A.

The human development index

To better measure human development in keeping with Sen’s approach, the
HDI combines information along three different dimensions. Recognizing that
Id. at 18–19, 36–40, 246.
Id. at 36.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 38.
71 Id. at 38–40.
67
68
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income has a role (but not the only role) to play in development, the HDI considers
(1) per capita income, (2) schooling (both mean years of schooling and expected years
of schooling), and (3) health (life expectancy at birth).72 The HDI is meant to rival
‘the handy usability of the crude GNP’, ‘but, unlike GNP, without being oblivious of
everything other than incomes and commodities’.73 Yet, as Sen himself cautions, ‘the
huge breadth of the human development approach must not be confused, as it
sometimes is, with the slender limits of the HDI’.74
The 2010 HDR marked the twentieth anniversary of the HDI’s introduction.
The team writing the 2010 HDR took this occasion to engage in some retrospection
and found that there ‘is the lack of a significant correlation between economic
growth and improvements in health and education’.75 For instance, the 2010 HDR
compared and contrasted two countries—China and Tunisia—to demonstrate the
disconnect between economic growth and improvements in health and education:
In 1970 a baby girl born in Tunisia could expect to live 55 years; one born in
China, 63 years. Since then, China’s per capita GDP has grown at a
breakneck pace of 8 percent annually, while Tunisia’s has grown at 3 percent.
But a girl born today in Tunisia can expect to live 76 years, a year longer
than a girl born in China. And while only 52 percent of Tunisian children

2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 13 fig.1.1, 15 box 1.2.
Sen, supra note 61, at vi.
74 Id.
75 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 4; see id. at 46–64 (explaining the data and reasoning
supporting this conclusion). The 2010 HDR draws a distinction between levels of
income and health and education, on one hand, and changes in income and health
and education, on the other. There is a positive correlation between a nation’s level
of income and its level of health and education; however, there is no significant
correlation between change in income and change in health and education. Id. at 47.
72
73
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were enrolled in school in 1970, today’s gross enrolment ratio is 78 percent,
considerably higher than China’s 68 percent.76
These findings confirm Sen’s insights more than a decade earlier regarding ‘the
dissonance between income per head . . . and the freedom of individuals to live long
and live well’.77 In fact, the 2010 HDR concluded that ‘human development is
different from economic growth and … substantial achievements are possible even
without fast growth’.78
But economic measures may not only be limiting but also misleading. Per
capita income, for instance, is nothing more than a country’s average income.
Averages such as this can mask as much—or sometimes more—than they reveal.79
In the case of income, averaging can mask profound levels of inequality in a
society—and, of course, will completely miss inequalities along other lines (e.g.
health, education, employment and social acceptance).80 Indeed, in discussing the
ways in which average income can be misleading, the 2010 HDR points to the
United States as an example of a country where ‘mean income is almost a third
higher than median income, and the gap is growing’.81 The 2010 HDR further points
to gaps of similar size in Italy and New Zealand and even larger gaps in Côte
d’Ivoire, Liberia and Zambia.82

B.

Additional dimensions

Id. at 47.
SEN, supra note 59, at 5; see id. at 5–6, 43–49, 108–10, 285.
78 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 5.
79 Id. at 87.
80 SEN, supra note 59, at 107–10.
81 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 72.
82 Id.
76
77
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To address such concerns, the 2010 HDR introduced a refined version of the
HDI—the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI).83 After taking inequality into account,
‘the global HDI of 0.62 in 2010 would fall to 0.49, which represents a drop from the
high to the medium HDI category’.84 In 2010, the average loss in HDI due to
inequality was 22%, and the losses ranged from a low of 6% to a high of 45%.85
A few examples may help to underscore the impact of inequality on
measuring human development. Taking inequality into account, the United States
would see its HDI drop by more than 11% (from 0.902 to 0.799), and it would fall
nine places in the HDI ranking.86 The Republic of Korea, another high-income
country and member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development,87 would see its HDI drop by nearly 17% (from 0.877 to 0.731), and it
would fall 18 places in the HDI ranking.88 Brazil, an upper-middle income country,89
would see its HDI drop by 27% (from 0.699 to 0.509), and it would fall 15 places in
the HDI ranking.90
The 2010 HDR also introduced a more refined measure of gender
inequality—the Gender Inequality Index (GII).91 The GII takes account of three
dimensions: (1) women’s reproductive health (through maternal mortality ratios and
adolescent fertility rates), (2) women’s empowerment (through national
parliamentary representation and educational attainment), and (3) women’s labor

Id. at 7.
Id.
85 Id. at 87.
86 Id. at 152.
87 World Bank, World Bank List of Economies (2011).
88 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 152.
89 World Bank, supra note 87.
90 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 153.
91 Id. at 89–94.
83
84
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force participation.92 As measured by the GII, the average loss in achievement for
the ten countries closest to gender equality was 23% while the average loss in
achievement for the ten countries farthest from gender equality was 79%.93
Again, a few examples will help to underscore the impact of gender inequality
on measuring human development. The United States ranks fourth in the HDI but
only 37th in the GII, with a 40% loss in achievement due to gender inequality.94
Qatar, a high-income country,95 ranks 38th in the HDI (placing it in the very high
human development category) but ranks 94th in the GII, with a 67% loss in
achievement due to gender inequality.96 More startlingly, Saudi Arabia, a highincome country,97 ranks 55th in the HDI (placing it in the high human development
category) but ranks 128th in the GII, with a 76% loss in achievement due to gender
inequality.98 Mexico, an upper-middle-income country,99 ranks 56th in the HDI (also
placing it in the high human development category) but ranks 68th in the GII, with
a nearly 58% loss in achievement due to gender inequality.100
There is a strong correlation ‘between gender inequality and the loss due to
inequality in the distribution of the HDI’.101 Yet, this measure fails to capture other
dimensions of gender inequality, including occupational segregation, the gender

Id. at 91 fig.5.3.
Id. at 93.
94 Id. at 156.
95 World Bank, supra note 87.
96 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 156.
97 World Bank, supra note 87.
98 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 157.
99 World Bank, supra note 87.
100 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 157.
101 Id. at 93.
92
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wage gap, and the experience of non-elites as well as women’s ‘time use, access to
assets, domestic violence and local-level empowerment’.102

C.

Yet further dimensions

The 2010 HDR candidly recognizes the limits of its measures, stating that, ‘as with
any aggregate measure and international comparison, it simplifies and captures
only part of what human development entails’.103 Thus, the purpose of the HDI and
the related measures discussed above ‘is not to build an unassailable indicator of
well-being—it is to redirect attention towards human-centred development and to
promote debate over how we advance the progress of societies’.104 Among other
dimensions that the 2010 HDR acknowledges are important to human development
are human rights and the political and social empowerment of groups of people,
sustainability of production and impact on the environment, well-being, the
availability of decent work and addressing threats to the human development that
has been achieved.105 In fact, the 2010 HDR included six new statistical tables that
cover these additional dimensions.106
Other contributors to development debates have also underscored the
importance of these additional dimensions to human development—in particular,
the importance of human rights. For example, recent empirical research from the
World Bank indicates that economic growth does not guarantee advances in human
rights. Put differently, ‘political/civil liberties and good governance are not a “luxury
good”: the process of economic development does not itself automatically ensure
Id. at 92, 94.
Id. at 13.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 17–19, 22, 85 tbl. 5.1.
106 Id. at 137.
102
103
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improved governance, civil liberties, and control of corruption’. 107 Indeed, this
research supports the conclusion that ‘[t]he causality direction is from improved
governance to economic development, not vice versa’.108 Consequently, there is no
‘automatic virtuous circle’, and ‘specific interventions and policies on governance and
[first-generation human rights] are required at every stage’. 109
Similarly, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) has highlighted the increasing recognition that ‘development and human
rights are interdependent and mutually reinforcing’.110 It has identified a clear trend
among aid agencies to adopt, develop, and refine human rights and development
policies.111 In collecting and reviewing the experiences of a number of these aid
agencies with human-rights-based approaches to development,112 the OECD
recognized the advantages of a human rights perspective in development work.113
Demonstrating the links between tax and human development that we will
turn to next, the OECD noted in its review how human rights have impacted tax
reform—and interindividual equity—in developing countries.114 The OECD called
attention to the work of the UK Department for International Development (DFID)
in Peru. As part of a larger project addressing the causes of poverty in Peru, DFID
promoted ‘a focus on equity and accountability–rather than simply efficiency–into
revenue policy and administration’ by ‘promoting the perspective that when citizens
Daniel Kaufmann, Human Rights and Governance: The Empirical Challenge, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 352, 382
(Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION:
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS INTO DEVELOPMENT 17 (2006).
111 Id. at 26.
112 Id. at 3–4.
113 Id. at 20–21.
114 Id. at 19, 43.
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pay taxes, not only is it a duty but it also creates rights’.115 Thus, DFID ‘set out to
ensure that resources reached excluded groups, on the expenditure side; and
promoted the perspective that paying taxes is not only a duty but also creates rights,
on the revenue-creation side’.116

V.

Tax and Human Development
Although ‘there is no consensus about development policy’, it is clear from the

discussion in the previous section that ‘new trends are emerging’.117 There is an
increasing recognition both that there is more to development than economic growth
and per capita income and that ‘captur[ing] the “missing” dimensions . . . is
increasingly feasible’.118 The time has come for these new trends to penetrate the
internation equity debate.
To begin expanding our horizons, commentators must first leave behind tax
exceptionalism and recognize that discussions of redistribution and internation
equity are no more than the tax aspect of a larger debate about development policy.
Our blinkered debates about internation equity—like debates about development
policy before them—have traditionally focused on per capita income. But, as the new
trends in the development debate highlight, per capita income is just one of many
lines of difference among nations that should be considered in formulating
international tax policy. Moreover, not only can participants in the internation
equity debate come to better appreciate the importance of the multiple dimensions of

Id. at 44; see id. at 117–22.
Id. at 120.
117 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 19.
118 Id. at 20.
115
116
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human development, but, as the 2010 HDR illustrates, there are measures available
for them to actually incorporate the human development approach into proposals
intended to further internation equity.
In keeping with the human development approach, the redistributive aspect
of internation equity can—and ought to—involve more than the shifting of financial
resources from higher-income ‘developed’ countries to lower-income ‘developing’
countries in an effort to shore up their per capita incomes. And expanding the focus
of internation equity beyond economic growth requires more than simply fashioning
arguments for enhanced forms of redistribution that incorporate noneconomic (e.g.
feminist, social or strategic) considerations.119 Such arguments still operate within
the linear framework of redistribution from higher- to lower-income countries.
In the remainder of this section, I offer proposals that embody a notion of
internation equity that promotes human development. These proposals are an initial
step toward fashioning a more robust notion of internation equity within the context
of the extant international tax regime. Others could—and, hopefully, will—craft
further proposals that advance human development in more ambitious ways. Indeed,
the principal aims of this Chapter are to influence the direction of the internation
equity debate and to lay the groundwork for future work integrating tax and
development policy. With that background, let us turn to a discussion of the
proposals.

A.

Reality check

119E.g.,

Brooks, supra note 35; Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S.
International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 45 (2002).
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A single assumption undergirds both of these proposals; namely, that, given
our extant international tax regime, nations can already be seen as providing
development assistance to each other through tax expenditures embedded in their
international tax rules.120 As discussed above, both departures from a source
country’s nonresident withholding tax and a residence country’s mitigation of double
taxation through the foreign tax credit or exemption methods can be conceptualized
as tax expenditures that provide aid to other countries. In this light, we will consider
exercises of source and residence taxing jurisdiction in turn, with related proposals
advanced for each.
Before reaching that discussion, however, it is important to state a caveat.
Once it is recognized that countries can provide foreign aid through their
international tax rules, each country must decide whether it is in a position to
provide such aid. Especially for countries that (1) underperform in terms of human
development and (2) provide little (if any) direct foreign development assistance, it
may be that scaling back or eliminating international tax expenditures is the most
appropriate step to take. The foregone revenue may be better spent furthering
development at home rather than abroad. If, however, tax expenditures that provide
‘hidden’ foreign aid are to continue, then it will be necessary to consider how these
rules might better target assistance to further human development.

This is, of course, not to say that development assistance should be run through
tax expenditures rather than provided directly, but rather to (1) acknowledge that
such assistance may already be provided through the tax laws and (2) where
appropriate, encourage better targeting of that assistance so as to further human
development. Cf. Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 1640; Brooks, supra note 48, at 549;
Brauner, supra note 48, at 312. It is also not to say that these proposals could not be
adopted even were it concluded that these provisions do not constitute tax
expenditures at all. See supra note 50.
120
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Furthermore, though I have, on occasion, used the United States as an
example in this Chapter, these proposals are drafted broadly and are not meant to
be limited in their application to any one country. In fact, the incentive created by
these proposals for all countries (regardless of income level) to advance human
development will only grow more powerful as more countries adopt them.
Concomitantly, the pressure will grow on nonadopting countries (assuming that they
choose to retain their international tax expenditures) to adhere to an emerging
international tax norm of targeting ‘hidden’ foreign assistance so as to further
human development.

B.

Source taxation

In considering how much tax to levy on nonresidents, a source country might
choose to adopt a sliding scale of withholding tax rates that varies depending on how
the taxpayer’s country of residence does in terms of advancing human development.
As a first step, this sliding scale could be implemented through domestic law. A
short target time frame could be specified within which all existing tax treaties
would be renegotiated to comport with the sliding scale—perhaps based on bands of
withholding tax rates built into the statutory sliding scale in order to accommodate
some reduction in the statutory rate as a treaty concession without crossing from
one level in the statutory sliding scale to another. Naturally, future tax treaties
would be negotiated from the outset to comport with the sliding scale.121
Indeed, the treaty negotiation process could provide an additional means for
expanding the web of countries adopting these proposals. A treaty partner’s firm
resistance to adopting the sliding scale approach would not, however, present a
problem because reciprocity in withholding rates is by no means an inexorable
feature of tax treaties. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation,
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the
121
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As described below, such a sliding scale could easily be tied to the measures
of human development in the annual HDRs, such as the HDI, the IHDI, and the GII.
These indices, though neither perfect nor all-encompassing in their scope, provide a
measure of human development that is just as handy as, but more meaningful than,
per capita income.122 An added benefit of these measures is that they are produced
by a team that works independently of the United Nations, thereby limiting
concerns about political influence in the creation of the indices.123 And, of course,
these indices can always be replaced or supplemented as more refined or complete
measures of human development arise.
For instance, the source country could afford the lowest withholding tax rates
to residents of countries that (1) appear in the HDI’s ‘very high human development’
category (to reward those already doing well) or are among the highest scorers in the
‘HDI improvement rank’ (to reward those making the greatest strides even if they
are not yet among the best overall) and (2) experience losses in HDI due to
inequality (as measured by the IHDI) and in achievement due to gender inequality
(as measured by the GII) below a specified threshold.124 This would result in the
source country ceding more of the national gain (i.e. providing more foreign aid) to
the residence country as it performs better in the HDR’s human development
Encouragement of International Trade and Investment, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, art. 12,
Jan. 9, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 164, 177–78 (limiting the Trinidad and Tobago tax on
dividends to a maximum rate of 25%, but imposing no limit on the U.S. statutory
withholding tax rate on dividends).
122 See Gustav Ranis et al., Human Development: Beyond the Human Development
Index, 7 J. HUM. DEV. 323 (2006) (demonstrating that a broader set of measures is
necessary to assess a fuller definition of human development than the basic one
employed for purposes of the HDI, but concluding that the HDI is superior to both
per capita income and under-five mortality rates as a measure of a fuller definition
of human development).
123 See supra note 61.
124 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 143–60.
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measures. In this way, the source country would encourage all countries whose
residents invest capital there to work to advance human development.
Conversely, the highest withholding tax rates could be applied to residents of
countries that either (1) appear in the HDI’s ‘low human development’ category and
fare poorly in the ‘HDI improvement rank’ or (2) experience losses in HDI due to
inequality (as measured by the IHDI) and in achievement due to gender inequality
(as measured by the GII) above a specified threshold. This would result in the source
country retaining a greater share of the residence country’s national gain as it
performs more poorly in the HDR’s human development measures. This would serve
as encouragement to the affected residence countries to pay greater attention to
advancing human development. Withholding tax rates in between the highest and
lowest rates could be applied to residents of countries falling in between these
extremes.
Countries would move among the different levels of withholding tax rates as
the measure of their human development changes over time.125 Accordingly, as a
country whose residents were subject to the highest withholding tax rates improved
in the various measures of human development, the withholding tax rates imposed
on its residents would be reduced under the sliding scale. Some underperforming
countries might not (at least initially) respond to this encouragement any more than
they respond to the segments of their own populations who are bearing the brunt of
There is little reason to be concerned about complexity arising from the
possibility of annual changes in withholding rates. For instance, the Internal
Revenue Service annually publishes treaty-rate withholding tables for use by
withholding agents and could do the same for a sliding scale of rates. I.R.S. Publ’n
No. 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens and Foreign Entities (2011).
Moreover, governments can combat abusive ‘rate shopping’ through stringent
limitation on benefits provisions similar to those already employed to combat ‘treaty
shopping’.
125
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their lack of human development. Residents of these countries would be punished for
this inaction by being subject to persistently high withholding tax rates—and
appropriately so. The marginalized and disadvantaged in these countries are not
likely to be among those making investments abroad. To the contrary, only those
with wealth and advantage—who are, directly or indirectly, benefiting from their
country’s underdevelopment—would be making investments abroad. Perhaps the
tangible, personal effect of a penalty tax on the segments of the population more
likely to be heard by those in power (or to themselves be part of the power structure)
will eventually serve as an incentive for change.
Once change is made and the measure of a country’s human development
improves, the withholding tax would be correspondingly reduced. At first blush,
there seems to be an ‘upside-down’ quality to the aid provided through this sliding
scale of withholding rates, as the benefit of reduced rates goes to those who are
wealthy enough to make investments abroad. But keep in mind that the benefit of
these lower rates only comes if those with wealth and power ensure that the lot of
the disadvantaged in their countries is improving. In this way, it is the necessary
obverse of the penalty tax imposed on those same individuals when they fail to
improve the lot of the disadvantaged in their countries. More importantly, by ceding
a greater share of the national gain, the source country allows the residence country
to claim a greater share of the gain through taxation for use in ongoing development
efforts.

C.

Residence taxation

A similar sliding scale could be applied by residence countries to their own
citizens and residents when determining how to mitigate double taxation. A number
33

of methods exist for mitigating double taxation. A residence country can (1) adopt
worldwide taxation accompanied by a credit for foreign taxes paid, (2) exempt
foreign source income from tax, or (3) provide a deduction for foreign taxes paid.126
Some countries, like the United States, use a combination of these methods.127
In their 1972 essay, the Musgraves asserted that internation equity concerns
only source-based (and not residence-based) taxing jurisdiction. Yet, as Peggy
Musgrave later noted, ‘the country of residence, as the residual taxing authority, has
control over the total tax burden on the foreign-source income of its resident
taxpayers’.128 How a residence country divides the residual national gain from
foreign investment between the taxpayer and its treasury will undoubtedly influence
where its residents invest.129 In this way, the residence country can affect which
source countries will be able to lay claim to a portion of the national gain generated
by its residents’ foreign investments. This channeling effect of residence taxation
impacts the redistributive aspect of internation equity.
A residence country could encourage investment in source countries doing
well in terms of human development by exempting income sourced in those countries
from tax. It could discourage investment in source countries doing poorly in terms of
human development by providing no more than a deduction for foreign taxes paid (or
for the worst offenders, by denying relief from double taxation). For countries falling
in between these extremes, it could choose among the following options:
1. Provide a foreign tax credit;
Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in
Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 267
(2003).
127 I.R.C. §§ 164(a)(3); 901(a), (j); 911.
128 Musgrave, Combining Fiscal Sovereignty, supra note 22, at 168–69.
129 Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 55
NAT’L TAX J. 487, 491 (2003).
126
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2. Provide an exemption from tax, but take the exempt income into account in
determining the rates applicable to the resident’s taxable income—so-called
exemption with progression;130
3. Employ some form of tax sparing; or
4. Some combination of these (or other) methods.
In this way, the residence country would encourage all source countries seeking
capital investments from its residents to work to advance human development.
As with the sliding scale of nonresident withholding tax rates, this sliding
scale of methods for mitigating double taxation would reward (i.e. target aid to)
countries doing well in terms of human development and encourage underperfomers
to pay greater attention to advancing human development. Naturally, some lowerincome (and even some higher-income) countries might not fare well in terms of the
amount of ‘hidden’ aid received under a sliding-scale system for mitigating double
taxation. (At this juncture, it is worth recalling the earlier examples of higherincome countries that have fared poorly in the IHDI and GII, including the United
States and some of its major trading partners.131) Again, this may be an entirely
appropriate result. If a country is not significantly advancing human development, it
is not likely to be an appropriate target for (direct or indirect) development
assistance, given the strong possibility that any assistance might not actually be
used to advance development.
Furthermore, given the lack of a significant correlation between economic
growth and advancing human development (recall the comparison of China and

130
131

Kaufman, Fairness, supra note 23, at 150 n.31.
See supra text accompanying notes 86–90 and 94–100.
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Tunisia above),132 any reduction in assistance should not unduly limit a country’s
ability to achieve real advances in human development and obtain more favorable
treatment under the sliding scale, leading to greater levels of ‘hidden’ aid that could
then be used to even further advance human development. Thus, far from creating a
vicious circle in which low levels of human development lead to tax deterrents to
foreign investment that impede advances in human development, this sliding scale
can create a virtuous circle in which advances that cost little in monetary terms can
lead to foreign direct investment that can increase the resources available to devote
to development efforts.
As mentioned above, more ambitious countries might take into account
additional dimensions of human development not captured by the HDI, IHDI, and
GII. These countries could turn to the HDR’s additional statistical tables containing
information regarding empowerment, sustainability and vulnerability, human
security, perceptions of individual well-being, measures of civic and community wellbeing and decent work—especially if those measures are further refined in coming
years.133 Other sources of relevant information include Amnesty International’s
annual human rights report and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans
and Intersex Association’s (ILGA) annual report on state-sponsored homophobia.
Whatever metrics a country chooses, some value judgments will necessarily
be involved—whether they are judgments made by others (e.g. if the HDR’s indices
and statistical tables are used) or by the country itself (e.g. if Amnesty
International’s or ILGA’s raw data is used). As Amartya Sen has explained, this is
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not a drawback—but a strength—of the human development approach.134 Even realincome measures entail value judgments, however concealed or implicit they might
be.135 In a similar vein, Kim Brooks observes, ‘That the application of a concept of
inter-nation equity requires value judgments is rarely explicitly recognized in the
literature, and yet the lack of traction that the concept has had for policy-makers
and scholars must be at least partly explained by that realization.’136 She continues,
‘The mistake, then, is thinking that inter-nation equity is something other than a
tool for beginning that conversation’.137 In this regard, the advantage of the human
development approach is in rendering these value judgments transparent and
explicit so that they can be subjected to ‘public scrutiny, criticism, and correction’.138

VI.

Advantages of an expanded horizon
In closing, I describe several of the advantages of widening the focus of the

internation equity debate to encompass both economic and noneconomic lines of
difference among nations in an effort to promote human development.
First, a wider focus would make the internation equity debate more
meaningful. As described above, economic growth may be a means of furthering
human development, but it is not the end of human development. Yet, the tax
literature too often ignores other aspects of human development in favor of a nearly
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exclusive focus on economic growth.139 By refocusing the debate on the ends to be
achieved through development, commentators will better be able to locate the tax
aspects of development in the larger human development picture.
Second, embracing multiple lines of difference among nations represents a
welcome break from the linear view of internation equity as being concerned only
with redistribution from higher- to lower-income countries. In this linear view,
higher-income ‘developed’ countries (who are assumed to have already arrived at the
end of the development path) pass money back to the lagging, lower-income
‘developing’ countries to aid them in their progress toward the ultimate destination
of being ‘developed’ (i.e. having high per capita income). In contrast, advancing
human development is a concern for all countries.
Amartya Sen has clearly made the case that human development is not only
a concern for lower-income countries but for all countries, including higher-income
countries.140 We are all engaged in the process of advancing human development
along different tracks and in different ways.141 That is precisely why the reform
proposals considered in the previous section make no distinction between countries
based on their status as high- or low-income; rather, each country adopting a sliding
scale would apply that scale to all other countries. Given its inclusion as a
component of the HDI (and IHDI), income would be a factor in determining where a
country falls in the sliding scale, but, importantly, it would only be one among a
number of different factors influencing that position.
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Third, even though the human development approach applies to all countries,
it ‘is first and foremost an ally of the poor’ and disadvantaged.142 As described above,
averages (like per capita income) homogenize populations and can mask profoundly
disturbing levels of inequality in a society. For instance, high-income countries (e.g.
Saudi Arabia and Qatar) show some of the greatest losses in achievement due to
gender inequality. In contrast to such averages, the human development approach
‘put[s] people at the centre’.143 Given the social justice focus of redistribution and
internation equity, it is important that the human development approach helps us to
bring the most vulnerable—for example, the poor, the disabled, women, ethnic and
racial minorities and sexual minorities—out of the shadows and into the center of
the internation equity debate.144
Fourth, situating the internation equity debate in a wider context allows us
to quickly address two criticisms that have been leveled at the notion of
international redistribution. These two criticisms relate to: (1) the lack of a
normative basis for redistribution and (2) the inability to differentiate between
‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ recipients of assistance.145 Both of these criticisms are
products of the unduly narrow focus on per capita income in the extant internation
equity debate.
Once the internation equity debate is situated in the broader development
context, it becomes clear that normative grounding for a more robust notion of
internation equity can be found in Sen’s capability approach and his related
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exposition of the advantages of a freedom-based approach to development.146 In
addition, the OECD has observed that ‘[t]he intrinsic value of human rights offers
development actors an explicit normative and analytical framework, grounded in a
consensual global legal regime. The framework can be adapted to different political
and cultural environments’.147 Moreover, ‘[a]ll states party to the relevant
international human rights instruments have a duty to promote and protect human
rights, including through international co-operation’.148
In terms of differentiating between ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ recipients of
assistance, Ilan Benshalom has posited the problem as follows:
Simply put, in a world where North Korea can spend money without asking
Japan for any authorization and can even use it to prepare for a war against
Japan, the Japanese will not be willing to engage in any cross-border
redistribution of wealth, regardless of North Korean poverty and the reasons
for it.149
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A more robust notion of internation equity that aims at advancing human
development could be used to sort out ‘worthy’ from ‘unworthy’ recipients of
development assistance. Those with a record of promoting advances in human
development (as evidenced in the HDI, IHDI, GII or other measures) could easily be
targeted for greater aid than those without such a record.150
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As noted above, there is still no consensus regarding development policy, and
the UNDP’s Human Development Reports and their formulation of the HDI and
other measures are not without controversy.151 However imperfect these measures
might be, using them to take account of additional dimensions of human
development beyond just economic growth is a step in the right direction, especially
when per capita income is itself far from a perfect measure of human development.
Moreover, the lack of a broad consensus on development policy is no reason to ignore
the emerging trend toward recognizing that there is more to human development
than just economic growth and per capita income and that ‘captur[ing] the “missing”
dimensions . . . is increasingly feasible’.152
Tax commentators do not shy away from discussions of efficiency merely
because there are competing notions of international efficiency (i.e. capital-export,
capital-import, national and ‘capital-ownership’ neutrality) and a lack of consensus
about which notion should prevail.153 To the contrary, commentators routinely
advocate policy prescriptions based on their preferred version of international
efficiency in an effort to persuade others of their correctness. There should be a
similar lively debate in which commentators air their competing ideas about how
internation equity and development fit together.
After all, Sen has underscored the importance—and great benefit—of public
dialogue about human development:
to contemplate targeting assistance based on a ‘commitment’ to the MDGs, whereas
using the HDI, IHDI, GII and other output-based measures could facilitate targeting
development assistance to countries that are already successfully advancing human
development (rather than merely promising to do so at some point in the future).
151 2010 HDR, supra note 61, at 15–22.
152 Id. at 19–20.
153 CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS:
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In line with the importance I [i.e. Sen] attach to the role of public discussion
as a vehicle of social change and economic progress . . ., this work is
presented mainly for open deliberation and critical scrutiny. . . . If my
arguments arouse any interest, and lead to more public discussion of these
vital issues, I would have reason to feel well rewarded.154
I can only express a similar hope for a rewarding public discussion regarding the
formulation of a more robust notion of internation equity—one that advances the
interests of all people, especially the traditionally disadvantaged, and not just the
interests of some homogenized ‘average’ person who inhabits a one-dimensional
economic plane of existence.
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